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I. A GREAT JUDICIAL FORMALIST
Although constitutional, Charter,1 and criminal law cases dominate
the Supreme Court of Canada’s docket, its Justices must decide cases
from across the full legal spectrum. No individual judge could be
expected to be expert in the three areas of law that primarily preoccupy
the Court alongside all of the other areas of law that are more irregularly
before it. As a consequence, individual Justices develop expertise in nondominant areas of law, usually based upon their experience prior to their
judicial appointments. Justice Rothstein took an active part in many of
the Court’s most important public law cases, and he also wrote and
became widely known for his judgments in intellectual property,
competition law, and administrative law. What is perhaps less well
known about him, outside of the tax law community, is that he was the
Court’s tax judge. He dominated the Court’s tax cases during his tenure.
Given the significance of his contributions to tax law, it would probably
surprise tax lawyers to learn that tax was only one of many areas of law
that he mastered.
Justice Rothstein did not practice tax law. He appears to have had
little experience with it before being appointed to the bench. His primary
areas of practice were transportation and competition law, and
administrative law more generally. However, in a speech he gave to law
students on appellate advocacy, he admitted that he was once a plaintiff
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Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
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in a tax case.2 He had invested in a limited partnership and made a profit,
which was “unusual for me”, and he and his partner (who was a judge at
the time) reported the gain as a capital gain. The government reassessed
them on the grounds that the gain was business income. He did not say
whether he won the case.
Our best guess is that Justice Rothstein developed an interest in and
considerable knowledge about tax law while sitting on the Federal Court
Trial Division. The year before he was appointed to that Court (he was
appointed on June 24, 1992), it lost its jurisdiction over most tax cases.3
However, the Federal Court Trial Division continued to hear cases in two
circumstances. First, if a case had been filed in the Tax Court of Canada
prior to 1991, the old procedure applied and the Federal Court Trial
Division would hear a trial de novo. Indeed, a case that he heard in 1993
on appeal from the Tax Court of Canada, Neuman v. Minister of National
Revenue,4 was appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada and remains a
leading tax case. We discuss it below. Second, because the Tax Court of
Canada does not have inherent jurisdiction, taxpayers who appeal against
an assessment by the Minister of National Revenue and raise a
constitutional or Charter issue appeal to the Federal Court Trial Division,
not the Tax Court of Canada. Justice Rothstein’s decision in Del Zotto v.
Canada is an example of such a case. It was ultimately appealed to the
Supreme Court of Canada.5 Justice Rothstein wrote 578 judgments in his
almost seven years on the Federal Court Trial Division.6 By our count, 35
of those cases were tax cases.
The Federal Court of Appeal, to which Justice Rothstein was
appointed on January 1, 1999, hears appeals from the Tax Court of

2
Justice Rothstein, “Winning Appellate Advocacy: Persuasive Presentations” (2006-2008)
32:1 Man L.J. 163, at 163.
3
Prior to 1991 the Federal Court Trial Division heard many tax cases since it had
concurrent jurisdiction with the Tax Court of Canada to hear taxpayers’ appeals from assessments
made by the Minister of National Revenue. It also heard appeals from the Tax Court of Canada
by way of trial de novo. After January 1, 1991 tax cases were heard exclusively by the Tax Court
of Canada and appeals were made directly to the Federal Court of Appeal. See Colin Campbell,
Administration of Income Tax 2011 (Toronto: Carswell, 2011), at 530-31 [hereinafter
“Campbell”].
4
Neuman v. Minister of National Revenue, [1993] F.C.J. No. 1332, [1994] 2 F.C.R. 154
(F.C.T.D.), revd [1996] F.C.J. No. 1108 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter “Neuman F.C.T.D.” cited to F.C.J.].
5
Del Zotto v. Canada, [1997] F.C.J. No. 85, [1997] 2 F.C. 428 (F.C.T.D.), revd [1997]
F.C.J. No. 795, [1997] 3 F.C. 40 (F.C.A.), revd [1999] S.C.J. No. 1, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
6
Carissima Mathen, “Choices and Controversy: Judicial Appointments in Canada” (2008)
58 U.N.B.L.J. 52, at 70, n. 65 [hereinafter “Mathen”].
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Canada.7 Over his six years on this Court he rendered judgment in a
considerable number of tax cases, over 90 (oral or written) by our count.
He wrote 324 judgments in his time on that Court.8 Thus well over onequarter of the Federal Court of Appeal cases in which he rendered
judgment were tax cases.
The Supreme Court of Canada hears tax cases by leave. Each year it
typically grants leave to only two or three tax cases.9 During Justice
Rothstein’s nine-year tenure on the Court, beginning on March 1, 2006,
he sat on 24 tax cases. He wrote the majority judgment in 12 of those
cases and wrote a dissent in two others.10 Thus, he was clearly the
dominant tax judge during this period.11 The tax bar certainly regarded
him as the Supreme Court’s tax judge. He was frequently invited to be on
tax panels12 and last year he was invited to give the keynote address at
the Canadian Tax Foundation’s annual conference.13
In this article, we review a selection of Justice Rothstein’s tax
judgments with the object of making two observations about his
contribution to Canadian tax law. First, Justice Rothstein, who was
appointed to the Supreme Court two years after Justice Iacobucci retired,
and in many ways stepped into his shoes as the Court’s tax judge,
continued Justice Iacobucci’s formalist tradition.14 That is why we have
7
The Tax Court of Canada has two procedures for hearing cases. First, the informal
procedure is for cases in which the tax in dispute is less than $25,000. The Court essentially sits as
an administrative agency in hearing these cases. Appeals on questions of law can be taken by means
of a request for judicial review to the Federal Court of Appeal. Second, the general procedure is for
all other cases. The Court sits as a Court in hearing these cases and appeals are taken directly to the
Federal Court of Appeal. See Campbell, supra, note 3, at 530-32.
8
Mathen, supra, note 6, at 70, at n. 65.
9
See Ilana Ludwin’s contribution in this volume where she discusses Rothstein J.’s role in
granting leave to appeal applications in tax cases.
10
These cases are listed in footnotes 15 and 16 of Ludwin’s article in this volume.
11
Since tax is such a specialized area of law, invariably one or sometimes two judges have
or develop a special interest in it and write most of the Courts judgments. For example, from 1979 to
1985, Estey J. wrote many of the tax judgments and between 1993 and 2002 Iacobucci J. wrote most
of the tax judgments (a few were co-authored with Bastarache J. or Major J.). On Iacobucci J.’s
domination of tax cases during his tenure, see David G. Duff, “Justice Iacobucci and the ‘Golden
and Straight Metwand’ of Canadian Tax Law” (2007) 57 U.T.L.J. 525 [hereinafter “Duff”].
12
See e.g., Brian Arnold, Judith Freedman, Al Meghji, Mark Meredith & Hon. Marshall
Rothstein, “The Future of GAAR” in Report of Proceedings of the Fifty-Seventh Tax Conference,
2005 Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2006), at 4:1-16.
13
Canadian Tax Foundation, 67th Annual Conference, November 22-24, 2015, see online:
<https://www.ctf.ca/ctfweb/en/conferences_events/2015/programs/2015_ac/15acprogram.aspx>.
14
In an article written as part of a collection of articles paying tribute to Iacobucci J.,
following his retirement from the Supreme Court, David Duff documents the formal approach that
U.K. and Canadian courts traditionally took to tax cases. However, he argues that from the late
1970s to the early 1990s the Supreme Court of Canada took a much more purposive or pragmatic
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titled this article “Carrying on the Tradition”. The tradition we are
referring to is the formalist mode of reasoning that Supreme Court judges
usually revert to in tax cases.15
As for approaches to judicial reasoning, it is common to contrast
legal pragmatism with legal formalism. This is not the place to define
these terms with any precision or review the debate over which is the
most appropriate. Essentially, in interpreting legislation, pragmatic
judges consider the consequences of various alternative meanings that
might be given to the legislation and choose the one that represents the
best policy outcome (in light of the structure of the legislation), while
formalist judges purport to derive their decision solely from the text of
the legislation and their judgments are written as if their decisions were
dictated by a technical legal logic.
Although judicial decision-making represents a continuum between
these two positions, Justice Rothstein was closer to the formalist end.
In his decisions, he seldom considered, at least explicitly, the
consequences of applying the law as he determined it to be in reaching a
decision. His basic view was that the policy of the law was the concern
of Parliament and not the courts. Put another way, there is no evidence
that Justice Rothstein’s decisions were driven by policy concerns or by
the consequences of those decisions; instead, in each case he appeared to
make a sincere effort to follow the text and doctrine as he understood it.16
To reveal our theoretical hand, we think judges should be more
pragmatic and less formalistic. A more pragmatic approach, in which the
judges carefully consider the consequences of their decisions, will lead to
more rational, coherent and accessible judicial decision-making; will
render the law more predictable; will increase the equity, neutrality and
simplicity of the tax system; and will more fully employ the unique skills

approach to tax cases. Then under the influence of Iacobucci J., who was appointed to the Supreme
Court in 1991, the Court returned to its traditional textualist or formalist approach in tax cases. See
Duff, supra, note 11.
15
We share a view about Rothstein J.’s approach to judging with Ilana Ludwin. See her
article in this volume.
16
That Rothstein J. believes this is his approach is apparent from his testimony on
appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada. See Opening Remarks by Mr. Justice Marshall Rothstein
to Ad Hoc Committee to Review a Nominee for the Supreme Court of Canada, February 26,
2006, Government of Canada, online: <http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?crtr.sj1D=&mthd=advSrch&
crtr.mnthndVl=&nid=209379&crtr.dpt1D=&crtr.tp1D=&crtr.lc1D=&crtr.yrStrtVl=&crtr.kw=tax%2B
&crtr.dyStrtVl=&crtr.aud1D=&crtr.mnthStrtVl=&crtr.yrndVl=&crtr.dyndVl> (“[j]udges are subject to
constraints. I will explain. As neutral arbitrators, we are to interpret and apply the law to the facts of
each case”).
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and institutional competence of judges.17 In Part II of this article, we
provide evidence of Justice Rothstein’s formalist approach by examining
one case he rendered while serving on the Federal Court Trial Division,
Neuman;18 and two cases that were decided when he sat on the Federal
Court of Appeal, Singleton19 and Stewart.20 Each of these cases was
appealed to the Supreme Court. We also review one case rendered while
he was sitting on the Supreme Court, Craig.21 Each has become the
leading tax case in the area with which it deals. We do not deal with more
of Justice Rothstein’s decisions at the Supreme Court because we have
discussed several in earlier work and because Ilana Ludwin does so in
her article in this volume.22
Part III of this article makes our second point: Justice Rothstein’s tax
decisions illustrate why he was so widely admired as a judge. They are
well written and technically competent. They are always well organized
and free of jargon. They often refer to and engage with the relevant
academic literature, they are closely reasoned, and they deal
straightforwardly with the arguments, as he sees them, on both sides of
the issues. Justice Rothstein clearly mastered the details of the Canadian
income tax system. He wrote many leading judgments, but in one area in
particular, the application of the General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR),
he wrote the first appellate court judgment while serving on the Federal
Court of Appeal (the provision was enacted in 1988). This decision
guided courts for a number of years. While on the Supreme Court he
continued his work in this complex area of law and his judgments at the
Supreme Court have laid the foundation for the future development of
the rule. Justice Rothstein’s tax jurisprudence is a testament not only to
his intelligence and judicial temperament but also a reflection of his
17
We have set out our position in an article in which we contrast the generally pragmatic
approach taken by former Bowman C.J. of the Tax Court of Canada and the more formalist approach
of the judges of the Supreme Court of Canada. See Neil Brooks & Kim Brooks, “Going for the
Jugular: Justice Bowman’s Approach to the Craft of Judging” (2010) 58 Can. Tax J. 5 [hereinafter
“Brooks & Brooks, ‘Going for the Jugular’”].
18
Neuman F.C.T.D., supra, note 4.
19
Singleton v. Canada, [1999] F.C.J. No. 864, [1999] 4 F.C. 484 (F.C.A.), affd [2001]
S.C.J. No. 59 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Singleton F.C.A.” cited to F.C.J.].
20
Stewart v. Canada, [2000] F.C.J. No. 238, [2000] D.T.C. 6163 (F.C.A.), revd [2002]
S.C.J. No. 46 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Stewart F.C.A.” cited to F.C.J.].
21
Canada v. Craig, [2012] S.C.J. No. 43, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 489 (S.C.C.), affg [2011] F.C.J.
No. 435 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter “Craig” cited to F.C.J.].
22
Neil Brooks & Kim Brooks, “The Supreme Court’s 2013 Tax Cases: Side-Stepping the
Interesting, Important and Difficult Issues” (2015) 68 S.C.L.R. (2d) 335; and Neil Brooks & Kim
Brooks, “The Supreme Court’s 2012 Tax Cases: Formalism Trumps Pragmatism and Good Sense”
(2014) 64 S.C.L.R. 267 [hereinafter “Brooks & Brooks, ‘The Supreme Court’s 2012 Tax Cases’”].
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legendary work ethic. His decisions are — surprisingly as this may
sound, since they are after all tax cases — a joy to read.

II. CONTINUING THE FORMALIST TRADITION
A formalist approach to legal interpretation requires judges to ascribe
a meaning to words with careful attention to the text and with little or no
attention to the consequences of the interpretive approach taken. Justice
Rothstein, like Justice Iacobucci, continued the tradition of judicial
formalism in Canadian tax law. In this part of the article, we review
five of Justice Rothstein’s cases with an eye to illustrating how Rothstein
was reliable and careful in his adherence to and practice of interpretive
formalism.
1. Neuman v. Minister of National Revenue23
Justice Rothstein’s second tax case on the Federal Court Trial
Division, and his first income tax case, was appealed to the Supreme
Court of Canada and became a leading tax case. Justice Rothstein’s
judgment sanctioned a blatant income-splitting tax avoidance scheme.
The Federal Court of Appeal overturned his decision unanimously,
striking down the scheme. However, the Supreme Court of Canada, in a
judgment written by Justice Iacobucci, unanimously reversed the Federal
Court of Appeal and restored Justice Rothstein’s decision for basically
the same reasons Rothstein had given. Although the case and its context
is somewhat convoluted, we review it in some detail because it reflected
the formalist traditions of the Supreme Court in this area and
foreshadowed the approach Justice Rothstein would follow in subsequent
tax cases.
In income-splitting schemes, high-income taxpayers attempt to
arrange to have income earned from their labour or capital, which would
otherwise be taxed at their high marginal tax rates, taxed in the hands of
a lower-income taxpayer with whom they have a close economic
relationship, such as a spouse or child. The scheme used in Neuman is
only available to taxpayers who are able to earn their income in a
corporation.

23

Neuman F.C.T.D., supra, note 4.
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Although the facts are often more complex, the basic design of the
tax scheme is straightforward. The taxpayer, who is usually (but not
always) the director of a controlled private corporation, has the
corporation issue a separate class of shares to a lower-income spouse or
child for a nominal amount. Then, as permitted by the corporation’s
articles of incorporation, which invariably confer discretion on the
directors to pay dividends of any amount to any class of shareholders, the
taxpayer/director pays the desired amount of the corporation’s retained
earnings (which would have been earned as a result of the taxpayer’s
labour, property, or entrepreneurial skills) to the child or low-income
spouse as a dividend. Because income tax rates are progressive, the tax
savings can be substantial.
This was the general structure of the arrangements in Neuman. The
taxpayer controlled a private corporation that was to be used as a vehicle
both to split his income with his spouse and to freeze the value of his
estate (which would reduce his tax liability on death). The corporation, to
which he appointed his wife the sole director, issued his wife a special
class of shares for $99. The next year the corporation paid his wife a
dividend on those shares of $14,800, which she promptly loaned interestfree back to the taxpayer. The Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) included
this dividend in the taxpayer’s income pursuant to subsection 56(2) of the
Income Tax Act (“the Act”):
A payment or transfer of property made pursuant to the direction of, or
with the concurrence of, a taxpayer to some other person for the benefit
of the taxpayer or as a benefit that the taxpayer desired to have
conferred on the other person shall be included in computing the
taxpayer’s income to the extent that it would be if the payment or
transfer had been made to him.24

The CRA argued that their authority for attributing the dividend to
the taxpayer came within the precise words of the section. The dividend
was (to paraphrase the legislation) “with the concurrence of…a taxpayer
[it was made with the taxpayer’s concurrence, the CRA argued, since he
was the controlling shareholder of the corporation] to some other
person…that the taxpayer desired (to benefit) [his wife]…(and it would
have been)…included in…the taxpayer’s income…if the payment [the
dividend]…had been made to him”. Even setting aside the fact that the
24
Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, s. 56(2), as amended by An Act to amend the
Income Tax Act, a related Act, the Canada Pension Plan and the Unemployment Insurance Act, S.C.
1987, c. 46, s. 15.

368

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2016) 74 S.C.L.R. (2d)

distributed income had been earned by the taxpayer’s labour and capital
and therefore under the most basic tax principles should have been
attributed to him for tax purposes, on the clear wording of the subsection
the CRA must have assumed this case was a slam dunk.
An important piece of context for understanding Neuman is that
three years prior to Neuman, a similar case, McClurg,25 had been
appealed to the Supreme Court. Indeed, the Tax Court of Canada
reserved judgment in Neuman until the Supreme Court handed down
judgment in McClurg. In McClurg, the CRA was unable to prove that the
dividends would have been paid to the taxpayer had they not been paid to
the spouse, so the Supreme Court held that subsection 56(2) did not
apply to attribute the dividends. The corporation might have simply
retained the earnings. In addition to suggesting that subsection 56(2)
would not generally apply to the payment of a dividend, Chief Justice
Dickson found that the taxpayer’s wife in McClurg had made substantial
contributions to the corporation in the form of personal services and
guaranteeing loans. Therefore, he wrote, to apply subsection 56(2)
“would be contrary to the commercial reality of this particular
transaction”.26 Further, he found that “the payments to Wilma McClurg
represented a legitimate quid pro quo and were not simply an attempt to
avoid the payment of taxes”.27 Chief Justice Dickson reasoned that “if a
distinction is to be drawn in the application of subsection 56(2) between
arm’s length transactions, it should be made between the exercise of a
discretionary power to distribute dividends when the non-arm’s length
shareholder has made no contribution to the company (in which case
subsection 56(2) may be applicable), and those cases in which a
legitimate contribution has been made”.28 In Neuman, the taxpayer’s wife
made no contribution to the corporation. Nevertheless, the Tax Court of
Canada purported to follow the holding in McClurg and refused to
attribute the dividends to the taxpayer. Justice Sarchuk held that the
statements of the Supreme Court in McClurg about the significance of
the taxpayer’s wife’s contribution to the corporation were obiter dicta.29
The CRA appealed the Tax Court’s judgment in Neuman to the Federal
25
McClurg v. Canada, [1990] S.C.J. No. 134, [1990] S.C.R. 1020 (S.C.C.), affg [1987]
F.C.J. No. 1156 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter “McClurg” cited to S.C.J.].
26
Id., at para. 44.
27
Id., at para. 44.
28
Id., at para. 45.
29
Neuman v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue), [1992] T.C.J. No. 288, [1992]
2 C.T.C. (T.C.C.), revd [1996] F.C.J. No. 1108 (F.C.A.).
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Court Trial Division since it wished to restrict the application of McClurg
to cases where the taxpayer’s wife had made some significant
contribution to the corporation.
In the Federal Court Trial Division, Justice Rothstein found that the
taxpayer’s holding company “was incorporated [only] for tax planning
and income splitting purposes”.30 Nevertheless, he held that subsection 56(2)
did not apply. Following Chief Justice Dickson in McClurg, Rothstein
held that the section could not apply since if the dividends had not been
paid to the spouse they would not have belonged to the taxpayer but
“would remain part of the retained earnings of the company”.31 He also
referred to a comment from McClurg in which the Chief Justice reasoned
that if he were to find that subsection 56(2) applied, “corporate directors
potentially could be found liable for the tax consequences of any
declaration of dividends made to a third party”.32 Justice Rothstein then
wrestled at some length with other statements made in McClurg about the
transaction’s lack of commercial reality and about whether subsection 56(2)
should apply “when the non-arm’s length shareholder has made no
contribution to the company”.33 After five pages of carefully parsing
Chief Justice Dickson’s analysis, reflecting a solid understanding of the
details of the Act, Justice Rothstein ultimately held that these statements
were not intended to suggest a separate basis for applying subsection 56(2).
He concluded his reasons by noting that “nothing in the scheme of the
Income Tax Act as a whole suggests an overall intention to prevent
income splitting”.34 In offering this opinion he paraphrased an assertion
made by Vern Krishna and Anthony VanDuzer in a case comment on
McClurg from which he acknowledged deriving assistance.35
In the Federal Court of Appeal a unanimous court allowed the
Minister’s appeal, struck down the tax planning strategy, and held that
the lower court judges were bound by the opinion of Chief Justice
Dickson that subsection 56(2) would be applicable to a dividend

30

Neuman F.C.T.D., supra, note 4, at para. 10.
Id., at para. 27.
32
Neuman F.C.T.D., supra, note 4, at para. 25 citing McClurg, supra, note 25, at para. 26.
33
Neuman F.C.T.D., supra, note 4, at para. 33 citing McClurg, supra, note 25, at para. 45.
34
Neuman F.C.T.D., supra, note 4, at para. 44.
35
Id. The paper is Vern Krishna & J. Anthony VanDuzer, “Corporate Share Capital
Structures and Income Splitting: McClurg v. Canada” (1992-93) 21 Can. Bus. L.J. 335 [hereinafter
“Krishna & VanDuzer”].
31
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distribution “made in the exercise of a discretionary power…to a nonarm’s length shareholder who…made no contribution to the company”.36
On further appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice Rothstein’s decision
was affirmed by Justice Iacobucci, writing for a unanimous Court.
Justice Iacobucci basically followed Justice Rothstein’s reasoning. He
concluded that “unless a reassessed taxpayer had a preexisting entitlement
to the dividend income paid to the shareholder of a corporation, the
fourth condition [of subsection 56(2)] cannot be satisfied”.37 Justice
Iacobucci also concluded that Chief Justice Dickson’s remarks about
whether subsection 56(2) might apply where the recipient of dividend
income in a non-arm’s length transaction has not made a legitimate
contribution to the corporation were obiter or, if not, were wrong. He
reasoned that in corporate law the payment of a dividend is not dependent
on a contribution by the shareholder; that whether a contribution was
legitimate could not be determined “with any degree of precision or
certainty”; and, that such a requirement would be inconsistent with the
principle that in the absence of a specific provision taxpayers should be
able to arrange their affairs to avoid taxes.38
Although this is meant to be a review of Justice Rothstein’s
contribution to tax jurisprudence and not necessarily a critique of that
jurisprudence itself, five interrelated points might be made about the
decision in this case.
First, Justice Rothstein noted at the outset of his judgment that this
was a tax avoidance scheme that had no business purpose. In the
Supreme Court decision, Justice Iacobucci asserted that “taxpayers are
entitled to arrange their affairs for the sole purpose of achieving a
favourable position regarding taxation”.39 Although Justice Rothstein did
not use the same phrase in this case (he frequently did in subsequent
cases) he clearly assumed it to be true. This might be described as the
standard formalist position. In the light of the costs that tax avoidance
transactions impose on the tax system, a pragmatic judge would attempt
to interpret the Act to minimize tax avoidance opportunities.
Second, in light of their commitment to the text of the legislation, it
is surprising that Justices Rothstein and Iacobucci (and Chief Justice
36
Neuman v. Minister of National Revenue, [1996] F.C.J. No. 1108, [1997] 1 FC 79,
at para. 64 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter “Neuman F.C.A.”].
37
Neuman v. Minister of National Revenue, [1998] S.C.J. No. 37, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 770,
at para. 54 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Neuman S.C.C.”].
38
Id., at paras. 60-63.
39
Id., at para. 63.
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Dickson in McClurg before them) interpreted subsection 56(2) in a
manner contrary to a plain reading of the section. The section does not
say that to apply the rule the CRA has to prove that if the payment were
not paid to the lower-income recipient it would have been paid to the
taxpayer. It merely says that the CRA has to prove that “if the
payment...had been made” to the taxpayer instead of the recipient it
would be “included in computing the taxpayer’s income”. Obviously the
dividend in this case would have been taxable income to the taxpayer if it
had been paid to him. Reading into the section a requirement that the
CRA prove that the taxpayer would otherwise have been entitled to
receive the payment is a stretch of the wording and is particularly hard to
justify when the transaction is a tax avoidance transaction. Moreover, the
Court’s reading of subsection 56(2) essentially makes the section
redundant. If a taxpayer is entitled to a payment, but directs it to be paid
to someone else, the common law doctrine of constructive receipt, which
requires a taxpayer to pay tax on income he or she controls even if it has
not been physically received by the taxpayer, would attribute the
payment back to the taxpayer for tax purposes.
Third, in support of their reading of the section both Justices
Rothstein and Iacobucci referred to a statement by Chief Justice Dickson
in McClurg to the effect that “[i]f this court were to find otherwise,
corporate directors potentially could be found liable for the tax
consequences of any declaration of dividends made to a third party”.40
This is a misleading overstatement. Subsection 56(2) requires that the
payment to which it applies be a “benefit that the taxpayer desired to
have conferred on the other person”. In this context, a benefit is
something received without consideration. In cases where income
splitting is not being attempted, the payment of a dividend will be a
reasonable return to a shareholder on their capital investment. That is
what dividends are supposed to represent.
Fourth, both Justice Rothstein and then Justice Iacobucci41 stated that
there is nothing in the scheme of the Act to suggest that income splitting
should be prevented. They both referred to the case comment by Krishna
and VanDuzer on McClurg in support of this proposition.42 Krishna and
VanDuzer are wrong on this point. The whole Act is premised on the
assumption that income will be taxed to the person who earns it.
40

Neuman F.C.T.D., supra, note 4, at para. 26 and Neuman S.C.C., supra, note 37, at para. 49
citing McClurg, supra, note 25, at para. 43.
41
Neuman F.C.T.D., supra, note 4, at para. 44 and Neuman S.C.C., supra, note 37, at para. 35.
42
See Krishna & VanDuzer, supra, note 35.
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Employment income will be taxed to the employee who earns it, property
income will be taxed to the person who owns the property, and business
income will be taxed to the business owner. Countless provisions in the
Act attempt to ensure this result. Subsection 56(2) is one of those
provisions and it should have been interpreted to achieve that result.
Finally, a more pragmatic judge in this case could have followed
the suggestion of Chief Justice Dickson in McClurg, namely that
subsection 56(2) applies unless the shareholder has made a contribution to
the corporation that would justify the dividend.43 This was essentially the
position of the unanimous Federal Court of Appeal in this case. To hold
otherwise would (and did) predictably lead to blatant and significant tax
avoidance. A study done of the tax years around the time of the decision
found that the dividend income received by persons under the age of 20
increased five-fold, from $51 million to $255 million.44 In 1999 the Act
was amended so that dividends paid by controlled private corporations
and received by related individuals under the age of 18 are be taxed at
the top marginal tax rate. In spite of this amendment meant to cover the
most egregious cases of income splitting — paying dividends to young
children — income splitting with low-income spouses and adult children
through controlled private corporations continues unabated. A recent
study estimated that the tax revenue lost through such tax avoidance was
in the order of $500 million.45
2. Singleton v. Canada46
A few years later, in Singleton v. Canada, the Federal Court of
Appeal sanctioned a widely used method enabling taxpayers with
investments to deduct the interest expense on their home mortgages.
Justice Rothstein wrote the judgment in the Court of Appeal for himself
43

In McClurg the significant contribution the wife made to the corporation was personal
services. As Rothstein J. pointed out it would be odd to justify the payment of a dividend on the
grounds that the shareholder had contributed service to the corporation. As he said, “[i]t is a
fundamental principle of corporate law that a dividend is a return on capital which attaches to a
share, and is in no way dependent on the conduct of a particular shareholder”, Neuman F.C.T.D.,
supra, note 4, at n. 6. The sensible position would be to require a capital contribution that could
justify the payment of the dividend.
44
Alan Macnaughton & Thomas Matthews, “Is the Income-Splitting Tax Needed? Some
Empirical Evidence” (1999) 47:5 Can. Tax J. 1164.
45
See Michael Wolfson & Scott Legree, “Policy Forum: Private Companies, Professionals,
and Income Splitting: Recent Canadian Experience” (2015) 63:3 Can. Tax J. 717.
46
Singleton F.C.A., supra, note 19.
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and Justice McDonald; Justice Linden dissented. The legal context from
which Singleton arose is that under the Act if money is borrowed for a
personal use, the interest is treated as a personal expense and is not
deductible; however, if money is borrowed to earn business or property
income the interest is a deductible expense. Although this result would be
dictated by the general provisions in and principles underlying the Act,
paragraph 20(1)(c) explicitly provides that an interest expense is
deductible if paid on “borrowed money used for the purpose of earning
income from a business or property”. The courts have held that to
determine whether borrowed money is used for a personal purpose or for
the purpose of earning income from business or property, the use of the
borrowed money should be physically traced.
This physical tracing rule places pressure on a taxpayer’s tax plan,
and more specifically on the ordering of the taxpayer’s arrangements.
Suppose a taxpayer has a $1 million investment that they wish to retain,
but they need $1 million to purchase a personal residence. If the taxpayer
borrows the money to purchase the residence, the borrowed money
would be used for a personal purpose and therefore the interest would be
nondeductible. Hence, tax advisors counsel taxpayers in this situation to
sell their investment and use the proceeds to purchase their personal
residence. The taxpayer then borrows $1 million to repurchase their
investment. In this case, the borrowed money will have been used to earn
investment income and the interest will be deductible. If need be, the
borrowed money can be secured with a mortgage on the home (the
interest will be deductible so long as the borrowed money was not used
to purchase the home).
Singleton was a variation of this basic plan. Singleton needed
$300,000 to finance the purchase of a home. He did not have a $300,000
portfolio of investments, but he did have $300,000 in his law
partnership’s capital account. He withdrew the funds from his capital
account, used that cash to purchase a house, and then borrowed
$300,000, which he secured with a mortgage on his house, to repay the
funds withdrawn from his capital account. These three transactions were
completed almost simultaneously. Following these transactions, on the
basis that the borrowed money was used directly to finance his law firm,
Singleton deducted the interest on the loan as a business expense. The
CRA disallowed the deduction on the grounds that the money was used,
in economic effect or indirectly, to purchase a home and, therefore, the
interest expense was a personal expense.
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One way to characterize the issue in this case is to ask whether, in
deciding on the use of borrowed money, the court should pragmatically
examine the consequences of alternative options for how a decisionmaker or taxpayer might determine the use of borrowed money or take a
more formalistic approach and be bound by the legal effect of the
taxpayer’s individual transactions (in this case the direct use of the
borrowed money could be traced to the repayment of the law firm’s
capital). In a previous article, we took the position that the sensible
pragmatic approach to interest deductibility in the Canadian context
requires an appreciation of the role of the physical tracing rule and the
acceptance that any rule will lead to equally arbitrary results.47
In the Tax Court of Canada, Justice Bowman (as he then was) held
that the interest was not deductible.48 Instead of distinguishing between
personal and business interest expenses based upon a tracing of the direct
use of the borrowed money, he applied the economic reality or the true
economic purpose approach in determining the use of the borrowed
money. In this case he concluded as follows: “[o]n any realistic view of
the matter it could not be said that the money was used for the purpose of
making a contribution of capital to the partnership. The fundamental
purpose was the purchase of a house and this purpose cannot be altered
by the shuffle of cheques that took place on October 27, 1988”.49
On appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal, Justice Rothstein wrote
the majority judgment reversing Justice Bowman and holding that the
interest expense was deductible. Although we agree with his decision in
result, his reasoning reveals his formalist hand. Justice Rothstein focused
on the legal form of the transactions undertaken, casting the issue as
whether the various transactions should be treated independently (in
which case the borrowed money was clearly used for business purposes)
or singularly (in which case the series of transactions resulted in the
purchase of a home). Justice Rothstein treated the transactions
independently on the grounds that otherwise “an unexplained inconsistency”
would arise; namely, if an initial capital investment in the law firm were
financed with borrowed funds, the interest would be deductible, but if it
were initially financed with cash and then subsequently the cash was
withdrawn and used for personal use and the firm refinanced with
See Brooks & Brooks, “Going for the Jugular”, supra, note 17, at 15-17.
Singleton v. Canada, [1996] T.C.J. No. 1101, [1996] 3 C.T.C. 2873 (T.C.C.), revd [1999]
F.C.J. No. 864 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter “Singleton T.C.C.” cited to T.C.J.].
49
Id., at para. 12.
47
48
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borrowed money, the interest would not be deductible.50 In holding that
the transactions should be viewed separately, he also noted that it should
not matter whether the transaction took place over the course of an
afternoon or some longer period of time.51 Next, quoting Justice
Iacobucci in Neuman, Rothstein held that the fact that “what the
appellant did in this case was solely for the purpose of reducing his tax
liability” was not a “justification for denying the appellant interest
deductibility”.52 He cited earlier Supreme Court of Canada cases to the
effect that legally effective transactions should be respected for tax
purposes.53 Finally, relying on a quote from Professor Krishna’s income
tax text, Rothstein noted that “the phrase ‘series of transactions’ appears
41 times [in the Act], its absence from paragraph 20(1)(c) implies that
there is no legislative intent to import the series test into that
paragraph”.54
The Supreme Court in a majority judgment written by Justice Major
upheld Justice Rothstein’s decision largely for the same reasons given by
him. Justice Rothstein’s approach to resolving tax cases was once again
endorsed by the Supreme Court.
In Singleton, Justice Rothstein also gave a policy reason for looking
only at the direct use of the borrowed money in deciding whether the
related interest expense was for personal or business use; namely, that
otherwise two taxpayers who had initially financed their businesses
differently would be treated differently for tax purposes even though
their asset positions and cash flows were the same. That is to say,
taxpayers who initially borrowed money to finance their business and
hence had cash available to buy a house would be better off tax-wise than
taxpayers who financed their business with cash and then had to borrow
to finance a home. He might have then set out the reasons why an
economic realities test would be difficult to apply in this context and
spelled out the other advantages of a strict tracing rule. Instead, he
reiterated the formalistic points that as a general proposition, a taxpayer
motivated solely by a tax avoidance purpose should not affect the
resolution of the case and that the courts should not look at economic

50
51
52
53
54

Singleton F.C.A., supra, note 19, at para. 49.
Id., at para. 50.
Id., at para. 60.
Id., at para. 61.
Id., at para. 63.
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substance, but instead the legal substance, of what the taxpayer did.55
Finally, as noted above, Rothstein referred to a convention of statutory
construction. Since the phrase “series of transactions” is used in many
other sections of the Act, but not in paragraph 20(1)(c), he concluded that
that paragraph should not be read as applying to a series of transactions
but only to the transaction that leads to the direct use of the borrowed
money. Resorting to a canon of statutory interpretation to determine the
meaning of a legislative provision is a hallmark of formalistic reading.
It seems unlikely that any Member of Parliament, Finance Minister, or
even someone in the Department of Finance made a conscious decision
not to include the phrase “series of transactions” in paragraph 20(1)(c)
because they wanted the courts to apply a strict tracing rule in
determining whether interest was incurred for a business purpose. Aside
from anything else, the predecessor to that paragraph was inserted in the
Act in 1923 in order to make it clear that interest was not to be treated as
a capital expense, long before the provisions containing the phrase
“series of transactions” were added to the Act.
3. Stewart v. Canada56
Only a few months after Singleton, Justice Rothstein wrote the
judgment in another leading case that dealt with a classic tax planning
strategy. This time, however, the Supreme Court did not approve of
Rothstein’s reasoning or holding. He struck down the taxpayer’s tax
planning strategy; the Supreme Court sanctioned it.
The case involved a commonly used scheme for arbitraging the tax
system — that is, for making money risk-free through the tax system by
deducting an expense from income that would otherwise be taxed at a
high rate and having the income earned by the expense taxed at a lower
rate. In addition, compounding the arbitrage, the scheme allows the
taxpayer to deduct the expense currently and defer paying tax on the
income earned by the expense to a future year. The scheme, which can
still be used, involves making highly leveraged investments in rental
property.

55
Celebrating judicial formalism, in her case comment on Rothstein J.’s decision in
Singleton, Lisa Wong concludes, “Singleton may be added to the growing number of cases that
recognize that policy making is best left to legislators”. Lisa Wong, “Deductibility of Interest: The
Singleton ‘Two Step’” (1999) 47:4 Can. Tax J. 952, at 957.
56
Stewart F.C.A., supra, note 20.
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In Stewart, the taxpayer invested in two condominium projects
through a real estate syndicator. The taxpayer made a $1,000 down
payment and used borrowed money to pay for the remaining over
99 per cent of the purchase price of the projects. In the sales literature,
the syndicator projected that the interest expenses on the borrowed
money would far exceed the rental income for many years and that a sale
of the property in 10 years would yield a substantial capital gain.
Even if the rental income and the capital gain only equalled the
taxpayer’s interest expense (so that in the absence of the tax system the
taxpayer would not earn any return), the taxpayer would still make a
handsome profit using this scheme through the tax system, for two
reasons. First, the excess interest expense each year could be deducted
from income taxed at ordinary rates while only one-half of the eventual
capital gain would have to be included in income. Second, the interest
expense could be deducted each year that it was incurred even though the
related (and likely accruing) capital gain would not be taxed until
realized, many years later. Even if the capital gain were taxed at ordinary
rates, the tax saved on the income sheltered by the excess interest
expense each year would be equivalent to an interest-free loan from the
government that would not have to be repaid until the capital gain was
realized. Everyone realizes that this arbitrage opportunity makes no sense
from a policy perspective. Indeed, in a 1997 case, Justice Robertson of
the Federal Court of Appeal, in setting aside a similar arrangement,
stated: “[i]t is simply unrealistic to expect the Canadian tax system to
subsidize the acquisition of rental properties for indefinite periods”.57
For whatever reason, over the years the Finance Department has been
reluctant to legislate an end to this tax planning strategy. Therefore, in the
early 1990s, the CRA began challenging these schemes on the basis that in
order to have a source of income, and therefore a deductible expense from
that source, a taxpayer had to have a reasonable expectation of making a
profit on the investment. In these types of tax shelter cases the taxpayer
would almost never have a reasonable expectation of profit because the
Act expressly provides that capital gains are not income from property
(which generate a profit) and in most of these cases it was the expectation
of a large capital gain (which are not “profits”) that made the investments
attractive. The interest expenses incurred on the borrowed money
inevitably substantially exceed the rental income.
57
Mohammad v. Canada, [1997] F.C.J. No. 1020, [1998] 1 F.C. 165, at para. 11 (F.C.A.),
revg [1996] T.C.J. No. 1359 (T.C.C.).
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In another area of tax law, in order to distinguish between activities
that taxpayers were carrying on as a hobby, and hence could not deduct
expenses, and activities that taxpayers were carrying on as a business
such that all of their business expenses would be deductible, the courts
developed the so-called reasonable expectation of profit (REOP) test. If a
taxpayer did not have a reasonable expectation of making a profit from
an activity, that suggested the activity was a hobby. However, in a
leading Supreme Court of Canada case, Moldowan v. Canada,58 where
this test was applied to assist in determining whether the taxpayer was
carrying on horse farming activities only as a hobby, Justice Dickson (as
he then was) concluded that “[a]lthough originally disputed, it is now
accepted that in order to have a ‘source of income’ the taxpayer must
have a profit or a reasonable expectation of profit”.59 Even though this
assertion was not necessary for the resolution of Moldowan, the CRA
latched on to this statement and began aggressively applying the REOP
test in tax shelter cases, arguing that unless the investor had a REOP the
investor did not have a source of income from the tax shelter investment
and thus could not deduct the losses from other income.
Following Moldowan, the courts reached inconsistent holdings on the
question of whether the REOP test should be applied only in cases where
the issue was whether the activity was personal (a hobby) or business, or
whether it could also be applied in cases involving tax shelters to deny the
taxpayer the deductibility of losses if they had no REOP and hence no
source of income from the shelter. Stewart was one of these cases.
The trial judge in the Tax Court of Canada accepted the proposition
that in order to have a source of income from rental property from which
expenses could be claimed, and ultimately a loss could be deducted from
other income, the taxpayer had to have a reasonable expectation of profit
from the rental income.60 He reviewed the plan of investment prepared by
the real estate syndicator showing net rental losses for over 10 years (the
plan assumed the taxpayer could deduct these rental losses from other
income) and the taxpayer’s intention not to pay down the principal on the
outstanding loans on the rental units for a number of years, which would
otherwise create a positive cash-flow. The trial judge concluded that as a
matter of fact the reasonable expectation of profit test was not satisfied.
58
[1977] S.C.J. No. 55, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 480, 77 D.L.R. (3d) 112 (S.C.C.), affg [1975]
F.C.J. No. 138 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter “Moldowan” cited to S.C.R.].
59
Id., at 485.
60
Stewart v. Canada, [1998] T.C.J. No. 310, [1998] 3 C.T.C. 2662 (T.C.C.), affd [2000]
F.C.J. No. 238 (F.C.A.).
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In the Federal Court of Appeal, with a panel that included Justice
Rothstein, the taxpayer argued that the REOP test should apply only to
distinguish between hobbies and business activities and only when the
activity involved an element of personal enjoyment, which investing in
rental property did not. In response, Justice Rothstein simply quoted the
obiter and highly contested statement referred to above from Justice
Dickson in Moldowan — that in order to have a source of income, the
taxpayer must have a REOP. In a very short judgment, Rothstein held
that in this case there was no reason to override the trial judge’s finding
that the taxpayer did not have a REOP and therefore could not deduct his
losses on the rental property from other income. In reaching his
judgment, Justice Rothstein spent almost no time addressing the view
that the REOP should not apply in these types of cases, even though this
argument must have been pressed upon him and was likely regarded by
the taxpayer as the central issue in the case. A number of highly critical
articles in the tax literature argued that the test should not apply in these
types of cases and that Justice Bowman in particular, but other judges in
the Tax Court of Canada, and even some judges in the Federal Court of
Appeal, had refused to apply the REOP test in tax shelter cases.61 Justice
Rothstein’s decision dealt with none of the problems of applying the
REOP to investments, such as the difficulty of determining whether the
taxpayer had a REOP, how profit is to be determined, whether capital
gains should be considered part of the profits for the purposes of
applying the test, over what time period taxpayers would have to show
they have a REOP, what properties could be grouped in applying the test,
and the effect of such a rule on investments in common shares, which are
often heavily leveraged and in which the dividend income is almost
never expected to exceed the interest expenses.
The Supreme Court reversed Justice Rothstein and the Federal Court
of Appeal’s holding that the REOP test did not apply to activities such as
investing in property where there was no possibility of personal
enjoyment. That test was to be used only for distinguishing between
hobbies and business activities. Justices Iacobucci and Bastarache,
61
See e.g., Cy Fien, “To Profit or Not to Profit: A Historical Review and Critical Analysis
of the ‘Reasonable Expectation of Profit’ Test” (1995) 43 Can. Tax J. 1287; Brian S. Nichols,
“Chants and Ritual Incantations: Rethinking the Reasonable Expectation of Profit Test” in Report of
Proceedings of the Forty-Eighth Tax Conference, 1996 Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax
Foundation, 1997), 28:1; John R. Owen, “The Reasonable Expectation of Profit Test: Is There a
Better Approach?” (1996) 44 Can. Tax J. 979; Sheldon Silver, “Great Expectations: Are They
Reasonable?” in Real Estate Transactions: Tax Planning for the Second Half of the 1990s, 1995
Corporate Management Tax Conference (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1996), 6:1.
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writing for a unanimous court, exhaustively reviewed the history of the
test, the conflicting case law, the judicial statements and law journal
articles critical of applying the test to property investments, and the
reasons why it should not be applied in such cases. They had no
difficulty finding that Justice Dickson’s comments in Moldowan about
the application of the test in determining whether the taxpayer had a
source of income were obiter and that they ought not to be followed.
Somewhat ironically, since Justice Rothstein would agree with this
sentiment in principle, they found that applying the REOP test to
property investment cases amounted to the kind of judicial law-making
that courts ought not to engage in.62
In this case, Justice Rothstein upheld a bold strategy being used by
the CRA to attempt to prevent tax arbitrage. We refer to the case here not
only because it shows a formalist approach to law, but also because it
illustrates he did not have a pro-taxpayer bias in spite of his frequent
resort to the mantra that generally taxpayers should be free to organize
their affairs to avoid taxes. In this case it would have been easy to hold
for the taxpayer on a number of grounds, as the Supreme Court judgment
illustrates. Further, the REOP test was a crude device for preventing the
type of tax arbitrage used in the case. The issue was an important one and
the subject of numerous critical scholarly articles and contradictory
judicial holdings. The only explanation for his short judgment upholding
the application of the REOP test in tax shelter cases is that he felt bound
by the statement of Justice Dickson in Moldowan that in order to have a
source of income the taxpayer must have a reasonable expectation of
profit.63
4. Canada v. Craig64
One of the most interesting tax cases to be heard by the Supreme
Court in recent years, in part because the Court was being asked to
overrule a 1978 precedent and in part because it dealt with a popular tax
shelter, was Canada v. Craig. We review this case in some detail in our
review of the Supreme Court’s 2012 tax cases,65 and review it here only

62
Stewart v. Canada, [2002] S.C.J. No. 46, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 645, at paras. 42-43 (S.C.C.),
revg [2000] F.C.J. No. 238 (F.C.A.).
63
Stewart F.C.A., supra, note 20, at para. 7.
64
Craig, supra, note 21.
65
Brooks & Brooks, “The Supreme Court’s 2012 Tax Cases”, supra, note 22, at 274-95.
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to illustrate that generally Justice Rothstein continued taking a formalist
approach to tax cases even after being elevated to the Supreme Court.
John Craig was a successful lawyer, earning taxable income of well
over $600,000 from his practice in the relevant years. He also owned a
horse farm on which he incurred a loss for tax purposes of over $200,000
in each of those years. For tax purposes, he offset the losses from his
farming business against the profits from his law business and reported
his net income. The Minister reassessed him and restricted the deduction
of his farm losses from his other income to $8,750, relying upon the
restricted farm loss rule. That rule restricts the deduction of farm losses
against other income unless a taxpayer’s chief source of income is either
(1) farming or (2) a combination of farming and some other source of
income. Since the case turned on the correct interpretation of the
restricted farm loss rule, subsection 31(1) of the Act, we set it out:
Where a taxpayer’s chief source of income for a taxation year is neither
farming nor a combination of farming and some other source of
income…the taxpayer’s loss, if any, for the year from all farming
business…shall be deemed to be [no more than $8,750].66

The interpretive issue in the case was the meaning of the phrase
“a combination of farming and some other source of income”. The
taxpayer argued that his chief source of income was derived from a
combination of farming and his law practice and therefore the restriction
in the section should not apply to him. Justice Rothstein agreed. He
reasoned (and this was a point made by many jurists and commentators
over the years, which he acknowledges) that unless the phrase allows the
taxpayer to combine two sources of income then it is redundant since it
adds nothing to the first exception to the provision, namely when farming
alone is the taxpayer’s chief source of income.67 The premise of Justice
Rothstein’s argument is the familiar canon of statutory construction that
every word (and phrase) in a statute must be given a distinct meaning.
Justice Rothstein’s decision in Craig features some of the same
players as his decision in Stewart. However, unlike his approach in
Stewart, in reaching a decision in favour of the taxpayer in Craig, Justice
Rothstein had to overrule Moldowan.68 In Moldowan, a case with
facts similar to Craig, Justice Dickson (as he then was) restricted the
66

Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), s. 31(1) as it appeared in 2012 [hereinafter
“ITA 1985”].
67
Craig, supra, note 21, at paras. 28, 29.
68
Moldowan, supra, note 58.
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deduction of the taxpayer’s farming loss by interpreting the combination
test in section 31 as applying only if the taxpayer’s other business was a
sideline or subordinate source of income. Justice Rothstein justified
overruling Moldowan on the grounds that it had read one of the
exceptions to the restriction in section 31, namely the combination
exception, out of the provision.69 Unlike his treatment of the case in
Stewart, in Craig Justice Rothstein took note of the “significant, judicial,
academic and other criticism” of Moldowan.70
What is significant is that while taking the drastic step of overruling
a prior Supreme Court of Canada case, and deciding the case on a
straightforward reading of section 31, Justice Rothstein did not discuss,
or even allude to, the purpose of the provision, the history of the section,
or the policy consequences of his holding. He assumed the case could be
decided by simply examining the words used in the section.
In fact, section 31, as interpreted by Moldowan, plays a vital role in
the tax system. That role would have been obvious had the Court
examined its history, the several policy discussions of it in government
documents over the years, similar sections in other countries, or basic tax
principles.71 We laid out those purposes in an earlier article and we will
not belabour them here. Our purpose in this review is simply to draw
attention to the consistency in Justice Rothstein’s interpretive formalism
throughout the trajectory of his judicial career — from the Federal Court
Trial Division, to the Federal Court of Appeal, and eventually to the
Supreme Court of Canada.
The purpose behind the restricted farm loss rule was of sufficient
importance that its interpretation in Craig resulted in the Government
announcing in the first budget following that decision that section 31
would be amended. The amendment negates the holding in Craig and
adopts the interpretation given to the section in Moldowan. The section
now reads that a taxpayer’s farming loss is restricted unless “a taxpayer’s
chief source of income…is…farming...or a combination of farming and
some other source of income that is a subordinate source of income for
the taxpayer”.

69
Craig, supra, note 21, at paras. 28, 30 (“the section is clear that two distinct exceptions to
the loss deduction limitation can be identified. A judge-made rule that reads one of the exceptions
out of the provision is not consistent with the words used by Parliament”).
70
Id., at para. 29.
71
These are reviewed in our comment on this case in Brooks & Brooks, “The Supreme
Court’s 2012 Tax Cases”, supra, note 22, at 284-93.
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III. LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR CANADA’S
GENERAL ANTI-AVOIDANCE RULE
One of the most significant developments in Canadian tax law over
the past 30 years was the introduction of the General Anti-Avoidance
Rule (GAAR) in 1988.72 The government introduced the rule because the
Canadian judiciary was reluctant to set aside tax avoidance transactions
using judicially-developed doctrines. The Supreme Court had rejected a
business purpose test, which would have allowed the CRA to set aside
tax transactions without a business purpose; was unwilling to examine
the economic substance of tax planning transactions; and was reluctant to
take a purposive approach when interpreting tax legislation, which would
have limited the opportunities for tax avoidance.
The GAAR requires three conditions to be satisfied before it applies
and permits the CRA to set aside an otherwise legal transaction for tax
purposes: (1) the taxpayer derived a tax benefit from the transaction;
(2) the taxpayer engaged in the transaction primarily to obtain a tax
benefit; and (3) the outcome of the transaction amounts to an abuse or
misuse of the tax legislation. The rule by necessity is open-ended and
relies upon concepts that had not previously been developed in Canadian
tax jurisprudence. Hence there was a good deal of uncertainty about how
it would be interpreted and how it would affect tax planning. It was clear
from the outset that judges interpreting the rule would have an important
balancing role to play in ensuring that abusive tax avoidance schemes
were struck down but that valid business arrangements would not be
deterred. It took many years for the first cases applying the GAAR to
work their way through the courts. Now about 50 GAAR cases have
been decided by the Tax Court of Canada; only four have been appealed
to the Supreme Court of Canada.
Justice Rothstein played a significant role in interpreting this novel
provision. In 2001 in OSFC Holdings Ltd. v. Canada,73 he wrote the first
comprehensive appellate court judgment on the GAAR. Sitting on the
Federal Court of Appeal, he set out the basic methodology to be followed
when applying the GAAR and confirmed the far-reaching implications of
72
Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), s. 245, as amended by An Act to amend
the Income Tax Act, the Canada Pension Plan, the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, the FederalProvincial Fiscal Arrangements and Federal Post-Secondary Education and Health Contributions
Act, 1977 and certain related Acts, S.C. 1988, c. 55, s. 185.
73
[2001] F.C.J. No. 1381, [2002] 2 F.C. 288 (F.C.A.), affg [1999] T.C.J. No. 378 (T.C.C.)
[hereinafter “OSFC Holdings” cited to F.C.J.].
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the provision; namely, that it would override the plain meaning of words
used by Parliament and that in determining whether there has been an
abuse of the Act, courts should resort to the full range of external
sources. The Supreme Court refused leave to appeal in OSFC Holdings.
Three years later, the Supreme Court granted leave to a number of the
other parties that were involved in the same tax avoidance transaction in
Mathew v. Canada.74 At the same time, the Supreme Court granted leave
in another major GAAR case, Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v.
Canada.75 The Supreme Court heard and decided both of these cases
together. In these cases, the Supreme Court adopted the basic approach
set out by Justice Rothstein in OSFC Holdings, but disagreed with
aspects of his methodology, as we discuss below. By the time the next
GAAR case reached the Supreme Court, Rothstein had been elevated to
that Court. He heard and dissented (on peculiar grounds, as we discuss
below) in the Court’s third GAAR case, Lipson v. Canada.76 Then in
2011 he wrote the judgment for a unanimous Court in the fourth and last
(to date) GAAR case heard by the Supreme Court, Copthorne Holdings
Ltd. v. Canada.77 In this case, he returned the Court (somewhat) to the
methodology he set out in his initial OSFC Holdings judgment and
established a firm foundation for the future application and development
of the rule. We review each of these cases highlighting Justice
Rothstein’s central role in developing judicial thinking about the GAAR.
1. OSFC Holdings Ltd. v. Canada78
In this case, a company with large accrued tax losses on a portfolio
of mortgages, which it was unable to use because it was bankrupt,
attempted to transfer them (for a price) to unrelated corporations and
individuals who could use them to reduce their taxable income. The Act
contains a number of specific rules to prevent corporations from selling
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affg [2004] F.C.J. No. 249 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter “Canada Trustco” cited to S.C.J.].
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tax losses to unrelated corporations or individuals.79 However, the
taxpayer in this case devised a scheme to achieve this end that involved
using sections of the Act that had entirely different purposes, but that did
not run afoul of any of the specific sections in the Act prohibiting it.80
The scheme was straightforward but detailed. Skipping over the
details, Standard Trust Corporation (Standard) was a trust company that,
because of the economic downturn in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
had become insolvent and was holding a mortgage portfolio with over
$50 million of accrued losses. A sale of these mortgages would trigger the
losses, but the losses would be of no value to Standard since it did not
have any taxable income to offset them against. So a scheme was devised
that would allow the mortgages to be sold to purchasers who could offset
the losses against their taxable income.
There was a section in the Act (subsequently amended) that was
designed to prevent a corporate taxpayer from selling property with
accrued losses to a related person and realizing the losses on the assets
for tax purposes. To illustrate its consequences, suppose that Standard
had other income and it wished to trigger the losses on its mortgages so
that it could offset those losses against its other income, but Standard did
not want to sell the mortgages to an unrelated person. Standard might, in
that case, form a wholly owned holding corporation and sell the
mortgages to the holding corporation. In this way, it would trigger the
loss, but still own the mortgages through the holding corporation.
Subsection 18(13) of the Act was designed to prevent this triggering of
losses. The way the section worked was that if a corporation sold
property with an accrued loss to a related person, the corporation would
not be able to claim the loss, but instead the amount of the loss would be
added to the related purchaser’s cost of the property purchased. Hence,
the related purchaser would be in the same position as the transferor.
That is to say, the related purchaser would be holding property with a
large accrued loss that would only be realized when the property was
sold to an unrelated person. The provision worked fine when the
79
Quite sensibly since if corporations that could not use their losses could arrange to have
profitable unrelated corporations use them it would be equivalent to the government refunding the
taxes on all corporate business losses. Perhaps the government should refund taxes on all losses as a
matter of policy but if the government made that policy decision they presumably would refund the
taxes on losses directly.
80
Schemes for so-called loss trading, in which a corporation with large losses that it cannot
use attempts to sell them to a profitable corporation that can use them, account for a good deal of
complex artificial tax planning schemes.
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transferee was a corporation, but if the purchaser was a partnership the
provision provided an opportunity for tax avoidance.
Under the Act, partnerships are not taxed as separate entities; instead,
partnership gains and losses are flowed through to the partners. Hence, if
the property with the accrued losses was sold to a related partnership and
the partnership sold the property and realized the losses, those losses
could be flowed through to individual or corporate partners. These
partners might be new partners (that is, partners who bought in after the
property was transferred) and unrelated to the transferor corporation.
In this way, a corporation’s accrued losses could be claimed by unrelated
taxpayers and used to shelter their personal income. This in essence is
what happened in OSFC Holdings. Standard Trust, the company with the
large accrued losses on its mortgage portfolio, formed a partnership in
which it took a 99 per cent interest in return for transferring its mortgage
portfolio (with its large accrued losses) to the partnership. It then sold its
99 per cent interest in the partnership to OSFC Holdings Ltd., a profitable
mortgage investment business. OSFC Holdings then sold its interest in
that partnership to another partnership in which it retained a substantial
interest and sold the other interests in that partnership to individual
investors, one of whom was Douglas Mathew. Incidentally, most of the
new individual partners were tax lawyers who were attempting to use
the losses to shelter income from their law firms from tax. When the
partnership sold the mortgages with the large accrued losses, for tax
purposes those losses flowed through to the individual and corporation
partners, including OSFC Holdings and Douglas Mathew and his tax
firm colleagues.
In engaging in these transactions, the taxpayer came within the clear
wording of subsection 18(13), which provided for the tax consequences
when a corporation transfers property with an accrued loss to a related
person (in this case a partnership), and subsection 96(1), which provides
that gains and losses realized in a partnership flow through to the
individual partners (even though they might have joined the partnership
during the year). Therefore, if the scheme was to be set aside, it would
have to be through the application of the GAAR.
The trial judge in the Tax Court of Canada applied the GAAR to set
aside the transaction. The taxpayer appealed to the Federal Court of
Canada and in that court Justice Rothstein rendered the first Federal
Court of Appeal judgment on the GAAR. He was breaking new ground
and he gave a detailed and thoughtful judgment on all the issues relating
to the application of the GAAR.
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As set out above, for the GAAR to apply the taxpayer has to have
received a tax benefit, there must be an avoidance transaction, and the
transaction must constitute a misuse or abuse of the Act. The taxpayer in
this case did not deny that they had received a tax benefit and that is
usually not an issue in GAAR cases. Therefore Justice Rothstein turned
his attention, first, to whether there had been an avoidance transaction
and, second, to whether there had been an abuse or misuse of the Act.
An avoidance transaction is defined in paragraph 245(3)(b) of the Act
as any transaction
…that is part of a series of transactions, which series, but for this
section, would result, directly or indirectly, in a tax benefit, unless the
transaction may reasonably be considered to have been undertaken or
arranged primarily for bona fide purposes other than to obtain the tax
benefit.

This section raises an interpretive question of how “a series of
transactions” should be interpreted and a factual question of whether the
impugned transaction was undertaken “primarily for bona fide purposes
other than to obtain a tax benefit”.
In OSFC Holdings, there were four transactions. The first three
transactions involved transferring the mortgages with accrued losses into
a partnership. The fourth transaction involved selling the partnership
interests to unrelated investors who would be able to utilize the losses
realized when the partnership sold the mortgages and flowed the
resulting losses out to them. Since the fourth transaction was not preordained at the time of the first transaction and might not have taken
place, the issue was whether all four transactions could be regarded as
part of a series, or only the first three.
Justice Rothstein thoroughly reviewed what might be described as
the common law meaning of the expression “series of transactions”,
particularly as developed in English tax avoidance case law, and the
meaning of the phrase as defined in the Act. He concluded that the fourth
transaction could be included in the statutory definition of series of
transactions since the unrelated purchasers knew of the previous
three transactions and took them “into account when deciding to
complete the acquisition transaction”.81 This was an important extension
of the concept of a series of transactions since the taxpayer in the case
and many commentators had argued that a series of transactions should
81
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only include transactions that were pre-ordained at the time of the initial
transaction. If the concept of a series of transactions had been interpreted
narrowly, it would have made the GAAR a much less effective
instrument for preventing tax avoidance. Justice Rothstein then found
that as a matter of fact the primary purpose of all four transactions was to
obtain a tax benefit.82 He reiterated a number of points essential for a
successful GAAR, such as, if any step in the series was inserted
primarily to obtain a tax benefit the GAAR applied (even if the series of
transactions taken together had primarily a business purpose). Thus,
taxpayers could not insert tax motivated transactions into otherwise
legitimate business transactions.83 He also noted that the person who
derives the tax benefit does not have to be the person who undertakes or
arranges the transactions.84
The most contentious step in applying the GAAR is determining
whether the transaction results in a misuse of the provisions of the Act or
an abuse having regard to the provisions of the Act, read as a whole. The
relevant subsection provides:
For greater certainty, subsection (2) does not apply to a transaction
where it may reasonably be considered that the transaction would not
result directly or indirectly in a misuse of the provisions of the Act or
an abuse having regard to the provisions of this Act, other than this
section, read as a whole.85

Before turning to the facts of the case, Justice Rothstein made a
number of general comments about this provision. First, he stated that
the provision invited two separate inquiries. One, the misuse analysis
involves considering the provision that the taxpayer relied upon and
“the policy behind it”. Two, the abuse analysis involves considering the
avoidance transaction in the light of the provisions of the entire act “read
as a whole and the policy behind them”.86
Second, he pointed out that the first question, about a misuse of the
provisions, cannot be determined by simply applying the plain meaning
of the wording of the provision or otherwise “the GAAR would be
rendered meaningless”. For, if the transaction did not come within the
82
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plain meaning of the words in the section there would be no need for the
application of the GAAR.87 He reiterated this point in noting that
determining whether there has been an abuse or misuse “is not an
exercise of trying to divine Parliament’s intention by using a purposive
analysis where the words used in a statute are ambiguous. Rather it is an
invoking of a policy to override the words Parliament has used.”88
Third, he noted that “the approach to determine misuse or abuse has
been variously described as purposive, object and spirit, scheme or
policy”. However, he preferred to “refer to these terms collectively as
policy [sic] of the provisions in question or the Act read as a whole”.89
Fourth, he said that determining “whether there has been a misuse or
abuse is a two-stage analytical process. The first stage involves
identifying the relevant policy of the provision or of the Act as a whole.
The second is the assessment of the facts in determining whether the
avoidance transaction constitutes a misuse or abuse having regard to the
identified policy”.90
Fifth, he reasoned that, since ascertaining the relevant policy of a
provision or the Act is a question of interpretation, it is the judge’s
responsibility to make the appropriate determination and the burden of
proof does not lie on either party.91 However, in light of the responsibility
this imposes on the judge, “the relevant policy [must be] clear and
unambiguous”.92
In our view, these observations about the abuse analysis required by
the GAAR are exactly correct and their application would make the
GAAR an effective instrument for combating aggressive tax avoidance.
Justice Rothstein then held that the transactions in the case before
him did not amount to a misuse of the specific provision used to transfer
the loss to the partnership, subsection 18(13). That section provided that
the accrued loss on the property would not be realized when the property
was transferred to a related partnership but would be realized when the
partnership sold the property to an unrelated party. In that case, under the
partnership rules the loss could be flowed through to the individual
87
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partners, who might be unrelated to the original transferor.93 The
transactions in the case were structured to comply with the letter and the
purpose of these provisions.
However, after a thorough analysis of the relevant provisions of the
Act, Justice Rothstein held that the transactions amounted to an abuse of
the Act as a whole. He held that the specific rules in the Act dealing with
business losses reflected a general policy against trading or selling
business losses to unrelated taxpayers.94 After a review of the avoidance
transactions undertaken, he found that that is precisely what happened in
this case.95 Therefore, the taxpayer was denied the tax benefit claimed in
the case.
In this first appellate court judgment involving the GAAR, Justice
Rothstein dealt comprehensively with a number of difficult and
contentious issues. In spite of the newness of the GAAR and the
complexity of the provisions of the Act that were involved, his judgment
was a tour de force.
2. Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v. Canada96 and
Mathew v. Canada97
The Supreme Court denied leave to appeal of Rothstein’s judgment
in OSFC Holdings. Hence his judgment guided the courts in their
interpretation of the GAAR for the next four years. However, the
individual investors in the same partnership as OSFC Holdings, which
was used to flow out the losses to unrelated parties, were successful in
seeking leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The case, Mathew, was
argued and decided at the same time as another leading GAAR case that
had been working its way through the judicial system, Canada Trustco.
These two cases were the Supreme Court’s first GAAR cases. They were
both decided before Justice Rothstein’s appointment to the Court and he
did not sit on the Federal Court of Appeal panel that decided either of
them. The Supreme Court held unanimously that the GAAR applied in
Mathew; that is, it upheld Rothstein’s holding involving the same tax
avoidance transaction, but that the GAAR did not apply in Canada
Trustco. In part perhaps because they held the GAAR did not apply, the
93
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Supreme Court, in a judgment co-authored by Chief Justice McLachlin
and Justice Major, set out at length its approach to the GAAR in Canada
Trustco and consequently it became the leading case on the GAAR.
Canada Trustco involved a sale-leaseback arrangement that under
the plain meaning of the provisions of the Act allowed the taxpayer to, in
effect, purchase capital cost allowances that it could use to shelter its
taxable income. The corporation that sold the capital cost allowances did
not have any Canadian taxable income against which it could offset the
allowances. In holding that the GAAR was not applicable, the Court held
that none of the transactions defeated the underlying rationale of the
particular provisions of the Act that the taxpayer relied upon. That is to
say, there was no abusive tax avoidance. In reaching its conclusion the
Supreme Court followed most aspects of Justice Rothstein’s approach to
the GAAR as set out in OSFC; however, they disagreed with parts of his
analysis. Parenthetically, if they had followed his analysis as he had set it
out, in particular if they had been willing to infer from the structure of
the Act the general policies underlying the Act, they likely would have
found that the GAAR applied to this case.
Most significantly, the Supreme Court rejected Justice Rothstein’s
approach to establishing a misuse or an abuse. Rothstein had suggested
the court should first examine the policy of the particular provisions the
avoidance transaction relied upon to see whether those provisions had
been misused and then engage in a broad purposive analysis of the
structure of the Act as a whole to see whether the overarching policies
underlying the Act had been abused. Instead of two distinct inquiries, the
Supreme Court stated that the two steps should be “incorporated into a
unified, textual, contextual, and purposive approach to interpreting the
specific provisions that give rise to the tax benefit”.98 Thus the Court
suggested there is no distinction between the terms “misuse” and “abuse”
as used in the GAAR and that it is only the policy of the specific
provisions that should attempt to be determined, not the overarching
principles of the Act. However, the Court did add, “[t]he policy analysis
proposed as a second step by the Federal Court of Appeal in OSFC is
properly incorporated into a unified, textual, contextual, and purposive
approach to interpreting the specific provisions that give rise to the tax
benefit”.99
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The Court stated that, “[t]he courts cannot search for an overriding
policy of the Act that is not based on a unified textual, contextual and
purposive interpretation of the specific provisions at issue” for two
reasons:
First, such a search is incompatible with the roles of reviewing
judges…To send the courts on the search for some overarching policy
and then to use such a policy to override the wording of the provisions
of the Income Tax Act would inappropriately place the formulation of
taxation policy in the hands of the judiciary, requiring judges to
perform a task to which they are unaccustomed and for which they are
not equipped.100
Second to search for an overriding policy of the Income Tax Act that is
not anchored in a textual, contextual and purposive interpretation of the
specific provisions that are relied upon for the tax benefit would run
counter to the overall policy of Parliament that tax law be certain,
predictable and fair, so that taxpayers can intelligently order their
affairs.101

On the basis of these observations, the Court proposed a two-step
test for determining whether the taxpayer’s transactions have misused or
abused the provisions of the Act: “[t]he first task is to interpret the
provisions giving rise to the tax benefit and to determine their object,
spirit and purpose. The next task is to determine whether the transaction
falls within or frustrates this purpose”.102
In Mathew, the Supreme Court struck down the tax avoidance
scheme that had been at issue in OSFC Holdings for essentially the same
reasons as Justice Rothstein. However, in view of the methodology they
suggested in Canada Trustco, instead of finding the scheme was an abuse
of the Act as a whole, insofar as it contradicted the general policy of the
Act that losses should not be transferable from one arm’s length person
to another, they found it was contrary to the object, spirit and purpose of
the specific provisions used in the scheme, subsection 18(3) and section 96.
They held that “interpreted textually, contextually and purposively,
subsection 18(13) and section 96 do not permit arm’s length parties to
purchase the tax losses preserved by subsection 18(13) and claim then as
their own”.103 In reaching this conclusion they looked at the text of those
100
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provisions, their context (“the general policy of the Income Tax Act is to
prohibit the transfer of losses between taxpayers, subject to specific
exceptions”104), and their purpose (subsection 18(3) denies the deduction
of accrued losses on property transferred to a related person because in
that case the transferor remains in control of the property; to allow a nonarm’s length person to claim the loss (through the use of a partnership)
would contradict this purpose).105
In commenting on Justice Rothstein’s judgment they wrote:
…[w]hile it reached the correct result, we reject the two-stage method
in favour of a unified, textual, contextual and purposive approach to
interpretation. This is an abiding principle of interpretation: to
determine the intention of the legislator by considering the text, context
and purpose of the provisions at issue. This applies to the Income Tax
Act and the GAAR as much as any other legislation. 106

Although perhaps there is not much effective difference between
them, we prefer Justice Rothstein’s suggested approach to that of the
Supreme Court. He was frank in stating that what must be determined is
the policy of the specific provisions and the overall policy of the Act.
The Supreme Court prefers to refer to the “object, spirit and purpose of
the specific provisions”. But what are the object, spirit and purpose of a
provision if not its policy? Perhaps not surprisingly, Justice Rothstein’s
approach is consistent with a formalist tradition: in his effort to interpret
the GAAR, he took seriously each word in section 245 and attempted to
give those words meaning. In many cases in deciding whether the Act
has been abused the judges will have to consider the policy judgments
that underlie the Act generally as opposed to the policy of a specific
provision. This is not, as the Supreme Court suggested, placing the
formulation of tax policy in the hands of the judge. It is asking judges to
determine what policy judgments underlie the Act, which they must
necessarily do, as Justice Rothstein did, by examining the specific
provisions in the Act and attempting to determine what broad policy
judgments are consistent with those provisions. For example, in Mathew,
it seems more correct to say that the court will not allow the specific
provision of subsection 18(13) to be used to defeat an obvious policy
judgment that underlies the structure of the Act, namely that corporate
losses cannot be sold to unrelated parties, than to pretend somehow that
104
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subsection 18(13) is being interpreted to achieve that result. In their
formulation, the Supreme Court appeared to be confusing interpreting the
GAAR with applying it.
3. Lipson v. Canada107
In 2009, four years after Canada Trustco and Mathew, the Supreme
Court handed down judgment in its third GAAR case, Lipson.108 Justice
Rothstein had been appointed to the Court in the interim and neither of
the judges who authored the judgments in the earlier two GAAR cases
sat on the Lipson panel: Justice Major had recently retired from the
Supreme Court and Chief Justice McLachlin did not participate in the
decision. Although the Court applied the GAAR, it was a split decision:
Justice LeBel wrote the majority judgment, Justices Binnie and
Deschamps dissented on the grounds that the GAAR did not apply
because there was no abuse or misuse of the Act, and Justice Rothstein
dissented on the grounds that the GAAR did not apply since a specific
anti-avoidance provision covered the case.
Lipson involved the same type of tax planning as Singleton.
A taxpayer purchasing a personal residence attempted to arrange his
affairs so that interest on the money that had to be borrowed to finance
the purchase was deductible. Recall that in Singleton, the taxpayer
withdrew his capital from his law firm to purchase a residence and then
borrowed money to refinance his law firm. In this case, the taxpayer had
an incorporated business in which he had a substantial amount of equity,
but, unlike Singleton, he could not withdraw the equity from the firm
without paying tax on the withdrawn capital as a dividend. Therefore, he
adopted a well-known, and one assumes a frequently used in-the-rightcircumstance scheme for deducting the interest on the borrowed money.
The taxpayer’s wife borrowed money and purchased the taxpayer’s
shares in his corporation from him for their fair market value. The
taxpayer used the money his wife paid him to buy the house. Since she
borrowed the money in order to earn income from property, dividends
that might be paid on the shares she had purchased from him, she could
deduct the interest expenses on the borrowed money. However, she had
little other income and, in most years, only modest dividends were paid
107
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on the shares, hence the excess interest expenses meant she had a large
loss on the investment. The husband had transferred the shares to her
under a spousal rollover provision of the Act, subsection 73(1), which
allowed him to avoid paying tax on the accrued capital gain on the
shares. Another section of the Act, subsection 74.1(1), provides that if
property is transferred from one spouse to another then any gain or loss
realized on the transferred property in the hands of the transferee is
attributed back to the transferor.109 The wife realized a loss on her
investment in the shares equal to the excess of her interest expenses on
the borrowed money over any dividends received from the shares. This
loss (essentially the interest expense) was attributed to the husband under
section 74.1 and he offset it against his other income. Thus, the taxpayer
was effectively able to deduct interest on money borrowed to purchase a
home. This of course is the same result as Singleton, except in Singleton
the equity that was used to purchase the home came out of after-tax
income, while in Lipson tax was not paid on the equity sold to the wife
because the taxpayer had deferred tax on the gain accrued on the shares
by using the subsection 73(1) spousal rollover.
All parties agreed that Lipson had obtained a tax benefit and that the
scheme was an avoidance transaction. The central issue on the appeal of
the reassessment was whether or not allowing Lipson an interest
deduction amounted to a misuse or abuse of the relevant provisions
within the meaning of subsection 245(4). The majority of the Supreme
Court, in a judgment written by Justice LeBel, held that the tax
consequences that resulted from the transactions were not consistent with
the underlying purpose of subsection 74.1(1), the spousal attribution rule.
The purpose of the rule, he wrote, “is to prevent spouses…from reducing
tax by taking advantage of their non-arm’s length status when
transferring property between themselves” by splitting their income.110
In Lipson, the taxpayer used the provision to deduct an expense that if he
had incurred it himself would have been a personal expense. That is to
say, the taxpayer used a provision designed to prevent tax avoidance in a
way that allowed him to reduce his taxes. Therefore, the tax-reducing
transaction “qualifies as abusive tax avoidance”.111 Justices Binnie and
Deschamps wrote a strong dissent holding that the Crown had “failed to
109
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identify a specific policy shown to be frustrated by the appellant’s
plan”.112 The difference of opinion between the majority and these
dissenters need not concern us here, but what is of interest is that in his
first GAAR case on the Supreme Court, and one in which the application
of the GAAR was clearly contested among the judges, Justice Rothstein
dissented but refused to join with either group of his colleagues.
Justice Rothstein dissented on the grounds that the GAAR was not
applicable because a specific anti-avoidance rule in the Act covered the
case. The anti-avoidance rule that he held applied provides that the
attribution rules (for example, subsection 74.1(1)) do not apply to “a
transfer…of property where it may reasonably be concluded that one of
the main reasons for the transfer…was to reduce the amount of tax that
would….be payable…on the income…from the property”.113 Justice
Rothstein held that this anti-avoidance provision, subsection 74.5(11),
applied to the circumstances of the taxpayer since “one of the main
reasons for the transfer of the shares was to reduce the amount of tax that
would be payable on the dividend income derived from the shares”.114
He justified this on the basis that if the taxpayer were to reduce the tax
payable on his other income with the transferred excess interest expense,
the tax payable on the dividends would have to be reduced to zero.115
Further, since that section applied, the Minister could not invoke the
GAAR since the GAAR was “only intended to operate as a provision of
last resort”.116 He held that the “[m]inister’s failure to invoke s. 74.5(11)
is fatal to his reassessment in respect of s. 74.1(1)”117 and, therefore, he
would have allowed the appeal.
Justice Rothstein’s dissent is odd. Both the Minister and the taxpayer
agreed that subsection 74.5(11) did not apply to the case and they did not
argue the point. The issue was not dealt with in the courts below. Justice
LeBel, writing for the majority, thought it was improper to consider it
since “its interpretation and application were not issues litigated by the
parties” and further he doubted “that the provision would have properly
addressed the complex series of transactions before this Court”.118
Justices Binnie and Deschamps in their dissent refused to consider the
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section since it was not argued and noted in particular that even the
factual basis upon which the section might apply — “that one of the
main reasons in the transfer…was to reduce the amount of tax that
would…be payable” — was not alleged or proven.119
Further, commentators have always assumed that the purpose of
subsection 74.5(11) is to prevent transactions designed to produce
reverse attribution from a high-income to a lower-income spouse. For
example, a lower-income spouse might invoke the attribution rules by
guaranteeing a loan that a third party makes to the high-income spouse.
Under subsection 74.5(7), any income earned on the borrowed funds
might be attributed to the low-income spouse. This transaction falls with
the clear wording of subsection 74.5(11). Although Justice Rothstein
carefully and analytically deals with all the arguments that were made
against his interpretation, at its best his reasoning might be described as
highly technical. But particularly given that his interpretation of
subsection 74.5(11) was so contestable, and contested, it seems strange
that Rothstein would not have used the occasion to continue to develop
his thoughts on the interpretation and application of the GAAR.
4. Copthorne Holdings Ltd. v. Canada120
Lipson caused a good deal of concern in the tax community,
particularly since the Court was split and there was speculation that the
Court might be prepared to either consolidate the effect of the GAAR or
scuttle it. Two years later, Copthorne Holdings became the Court’s fourth
(and now the leading) case on the GAAR. Justice Rothstein wrote the
judgment upholding the application of the GAAR in the case and his
judgment was supported unanimously by the Court.121 His judgment is a
model of the judicial craft. It is logically and tightly organized, clear and
concise, and dealt comprehensively with all of the outstanding issues
relating to the application of the GAAR.
The facts of the case are not important, but basically the tax
avoidance scheme involved attempting to increase a subsidiary
corporation’s paid-up capital so that more of its retained earnings could
119
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be paid to a parent corporation as a tax-free return of capital (which
might result in a capital gain) instead of as a dividend. Under the Act, a
corporation’s paid-up capital represents the equity capital that the
shareholders have invested in the corporation. This amount can be
returned to the shareholder as a non-taxable return of capital. In a
distribution to shareholders, any amount paid in excess of a return of
capital is treated as a dividend. Thus, the concept of paid-up capital is
crucial in the taxation of corporate distributions since, to the extent it is
increased, a corporation can make a larger return of capital to the
shareholders and avoid having the distribution treated as a dividend.
Generally, under the Act, if corporations engage in a horizontal
amalgamation their paid-up capitals are aggregated. However, if they
engage in a vertical amalgamation, the paid-up-capital of the subsidiary
corporation is cancelled. To illustrate the sense of this result, and to see
how the issue in Copthorne arose, assume a parent corporation
establishes two “sister” subsidiaries and capitalizes each with an equity
contribution of say $100. In that case each subsidiary corporation would
be able to pay $100 to the parent as a return of capital. If the
two subsidiary corporations amalgamate by means of a horizontal
amalgamation, the paid-up capital of the new amalgamated corporation
will be $200, namely the paid-up capital of each of the subsidiary
corporations, since that is the amount the parent corporation contributed
to the corporations. But assume a parent corporation establishes one
subsidiary and capitalizes it with a payment of $100. Now assume that
subsidiary corporation establishes its own sub-subsidiary and capitalizes
it with a payment of $100. The paid-up capital of the subsidiary and the
sub-subsidiary will each be $100. The sub-subsidiary will be able to
pay $100 to the subsidiary as a return of capital and the subsidiary will
be able to pay the parent corporation $100 as a return of capital. Now
assume that the sub-subsidiary and subsidiary engage in a vertical
amalgamation. In that case under the Act the paid-up capital of the
amalgamated subsidiary will remain at $100. The reason for this is
obvious. Otherwise a corporation that capitalizes its subsidiary with a
paid-up capital of $100 could increase the paid-up capital that could be
returned to it by simply forming a chain of subsidiaries and capitalizing
each with the same $100 as it moves down the chain. If there were five
subsidiaries in the chain and each capitalized the lower subsidiary with
the same $100 if they were all vertically amalgamated the paid-up capital
of the subsidiary would be $500 even though the parent only capitalized
it with $100. Hence the Act provides that on a vertical amalgamation the

(2016) 74 S.C.L.R. (2d)

CONTRIBUTION TO CANADIAN TAX LAW

399

paid-up capital of the subsidiaries are not aggregated but instead the
paid-up capital of the subsidiaries are cancelled.
In Copthorne (stylizing the facts slightly) a nonresident corporation
owned a Canadian subsidiary, which in turn owned a sub-subsidiary. The
nonresident wished to redeem the shares of the Canadian corporation and
have the amount paid to it treated as a return of capital. If it had
amalgamated its Canadian subsidiary and its sub-subsidiary by means of
a vertical amalgamation, the paid-up capital of the sub-subsidiary would
have been cancelled. So, instead of proceeding in this way, the subsidiary
sold the shares of the sub-subsidiary to the nonresident parent, hence the
Canadian subsidiary and its sub-subsidiary became “sister” corporations.
They horizontally amalgamated next. Then, upon redemption of the
shares of the new amalgamated corporation, the nonresident corporation
argued that since the two subsidiary corporations had engaged in
horizontal amalgamation their paid-up capitals should be aggregated.
Hence the amount paid for the redemption of shares, which did not
exceed this aggregated amount, should be treated as a return of capital.
The technical provisions of the Act were complied with, and yet, the
result was that if the transactions were allowed to stand corporations
could artificially increase the paid-up capital of their subsidiaries simply
by capitalizing a chain of corporations and then through a series of
transactions have them enter into horizontal amalgamations.
Justice Rothstein begins his judgment with five paragraphs that
provide a general description of the issue and how it arose. He gives the
description concisely and straightforwardly, so that the issue can be
understood intuitively. The character of his judgments is part of his
genius as a judge. He does it much better than we did above. Following a
detailed statement of the facts and the proceedings in the lower courts, he
methodically goes through each step required in applying the GAAR.
First, he held that there was a tax benefit. He compared the tax paid
on the redemption of the shares after the horizontal amalgamation with
the tax that would have been paid if the more straightforward vertical
amalgamation had been undertaken.122
Second, he found that there was a series of transactions that gave rise
to the tax benefit and that these transactions were not entered into
primarily for a bona fide non-tax purpose. In making this finding he had
to find that the eventual redemption of the shares should be included in
the series of transactions that gave rise to the tax benefit (along with the
122
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sale of the subsidiary shares to the nonresident parent corporation and the
subsequent horizontal amalgamation of the subsidiary and the Canadian
corporation). He followed Canada Trustco in holding that a transaction
would be part of the series if it was done “in relation to” or “because of”
the series.123 The statutory definition of “series of transactions” reads:
“the series shall be deemed to include any related transactions or events
completed in contemplation of the series”.124 The taxpayer, supported by
some commentators, argued that this definition should be read narrowly
as including only transactions that were initially contemplated as part of
the series. However, based in part on statements by the Supreme Court in
Canada Trustco and, he noted, on the interpretation of the phrase as it
was applied in OSFC Holdings, he held that a broader interpretation that
applied both prospectively and retrospectively accords with the
Parliamentary purpose.125 Having given this meaning to the phrase
“series of transactions” he had little difficulty finding that “the prior sale
and amalgamation…including the redemption transaction, resulted in a
tax benefit”.126
Finally, he had to decide whether the avoidance transaction was
abusive. He began his analysis, as he did in OSFC Holdings, by setting
out some general propositions relating to the interpretation and
application of the GAAR. Setting out the premises from which he
proceeds not only makes his judgments more interesting to read, but it
makes them more transparent. We think it is a good practice even though
we disagree with a couple of his premises, as we mention below. First, he
offered his opinion that the terms abuse and misuse in applying the
GAAR should not be taken to imply that there is any “moral
opprobrium” when taxpayers attempt to minimize their tax liabilities by
“utilizing the provisions of the Income Tax Act in a creative way”. Such
an implication he suggests “would be inappropriate”.127 It is not clear to
us why Justice Rothstein would offer this opinion. Presumably the
morality of the conduct in question should be irrelevant to the decision.
Second, he affirmed that “[t]axpayers are entitled to select courses of
action or enter into transactions that will minimize their tax liability.”128
The proposition is perfectly general and perfectly meaningless. Of course
123
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taxpayers are entitled to order their affairs to minimize their taxes. The
only interesting question is: have they done so? The general proposition
does not help resolve that question.
Third, noting that with the enactment of the GAAR “Parliament has
conferred on the court the unusual duty of going behind the words of the
legislation to determine the object, spirit or purpose of the
provision…relied upon by the taxpayer”129 Justice Rothstein cautions
that “[t]he GAAR does create some uncertainty for taxpayers” and
“the court must approach a GAAR decision cautiously”. He also quotes a
number of cautionary warnings from Canada Trustco: that the GARR
was enacted “as a provision of last resort”; “Parliament must…be taken
to seek consistency, predictability and fairness in tax law”; and “the
GAAR can only be applied…when the abusive nature of the transaction
is clear”.130 It is not clear why the Supreme Court, including Justice
Rothstein, is so wary of the GAAR. It is a direction by Parliament to the
courts, like all pieces of legislation. It is not obvious why the courts
should be any more cautious or concerned about consistency and fairness
in applying the GAAR than they should be in applying any other tax
provision. Nor would the suggested higher standard of clarity in
determining the abusive nature of a transaction seem to be required. This
is particularly so since before they get to the abuse analysis in a GAAR
case a judge would have already determined that the transaction or series
of transactions resulted in a “tax benefit [that could not]…reasonably be
considered to have been undertaken or arranged primarily for bona fide
purposes other than to obtain the tax benefit”.131 Thus, even if they get it
wrong at this stage of the analysis and hold a transaction to be abusive
when it is not, they will not have affected a transaction that was engaged
in for a bona fide business purpose. Indeed, in the light of the serious
costs that tax avoidance imposes on the tax system the default decisionmaking rule should perhaps run in the other direction. Additionally, it
does not appear that the application of the GAAR gives rise to much
uncertainty. In Copthorne, for example, every judge who heard the case,
13 separate judges, held that GAAR applied.
Fourth, reiterating a point the Supreme Court made in Lipson, Justice
Rothstein stated that in considering whether a transaction frustrates the
purpose of a particular provision, if it is part of a series of transactions
129
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then it must be considered “in the context of the series of which it is a
part and the overall result that is achieved”.132
Fifth, accepting the point made in Canada Trustco, he noted that
there was no distinction between abuse and misuse but only “a single
unified approach”.133
Sixth, Justice Rothstein reiterated the two-step approach that had
been adopted in Canada Trustco in determining whether a transaction (or
series of transactions) amounted to an abuse or misuse of the Act. First, a
court “must determine the ‘object, spirit or purpose of the provisions…that
are relied on the for tax benefit, having regard to the scheme of the Act,
the relevant provisions and permissible extrinsic aids’”.134 Second, “a
court must consider whether the transaction falls within or frustrates the
identified purpose”.135 In stating the first step he quoted from Canada
Trustco, presumably since they were so critical of his suggestion in
OSFC Holdings that the court should consider both the policy of the
provisions and the policy of the Act itself. Yet, as noted, it is hard to
know what “object, spirit or purpose” of a provision refers to if not the
policy underlying it. And, in many cases, it will be a policy judgment that
is apparent by examining other provisions or the structure of the Act that
is being frustrated not the spirit (or policy) of the specific provisions
that the taxpayer relied upon. Although Justice Rothstein does not press
the point, he does refer to a quote from Krishna’s income tax text that
basically makes the point he made in OSFC Holdings: “[t]he object,
spirit or purpose of the provisions has been referred to (by Krishna) as
the ‘legislative rationale that underlies specific or interrelated provisions
in the Act’”.136
Having set out these preliminary points, Rothstein then undertook a
careful, comprehensive review applying the proposed analysis to
the transactions in the case. He suggested that in this case it was
subsection 87(3) that might have been abused. This is the section that
provides that on a horizontal amalgamation the paid-up capital of the
predecessor corporations are aggregated, but that in a vertical
amalgamation the paid-up capital of the subsidiary corporation is
cancelled. Following the formula provided in Canada Trustco, he then
examined at length under separate headings the “text, context and
132
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purpose” of subsection 87(3). He broke the “context” section down into
five separate sub-headings. Following this detailed analysis, he
concluded that the purpose of the concept of paid-up capital is to allow
for the non-taxable return of the shareholders’ (tax-paid) capital (and any
amount paid to shareholders in excess of that should be taxed as a
dividend). He also determined that the purpose of cancelling the paid-up
capital of the subsidiary corporation in a vertical amalgamation is to
prevent corporations from creating additional paid-up capital that could
be returned to shareholders simply by passing the capital contributed by
shareholders down through a chain of subsidiaries and then vertically
amalgamating them. It is a thorough analysis.
In the second step of the analysis, he held that the transactions
engaged in by the taxpayer amounted to an abuse of these provisions.
In particular, the sale of the Canadian subsidiary to the nonresident
parent corporation (so that a horizontal amalgamation could take place
between the Canadian subsidiary and its Canadian parent instead of a
vertical amalgamation) circumvented the requirement in subsection 87(3)
that on a vertical amalgamation the paid-up capital of the subsidiary
corporation is cancelled in order to preserve the purpose of the concept
of paid-up capital.137
Copthorne had reminded the Court in its argument that, based on the
admonition in Canada Trustco, it could not rest its reasoning about
whether there had been an abuse on a general policy purporting to
underlie the Act. However, Justice Rothstein replied that “the tax purpose
identified in these reasons is based upon an examination of the PUC
(paid-up capital) sections of the Act, not a broadly stated policy”.138 But
of course presumably that is what Rothstein meant when he talked about
the overriding policy of the Act in OSFC Holdings; namely, one that
could be inferred from the specific provisions and structure of the Act.
Although Justice Rothstein mentioned at the outset of his analysis that,
as stated in Canada Trustco, with respect to determining an abuse of the
Act the burden was on the Crown to explain the policy that was abused
and the benefit of the doubt should go to the taxpayer, in fact Rothstein did
not review the evidence that the Crown had presented or address whether
the burden had been met. He proceeded as judges generally do in
determining the law and its application; he simply addressed the issue as if
it was his responsibility to reach the appropriate decision.
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Under Justice Rothstein’s influence, the Court has reached an
appropriate interpretation of the GAAR. Although some details remain to
be worked out, the Court has clearly signalled that the GAAR has an
important role to play in addressing abusive tax avoidance and has
provided effective tools of analysis for achieving that result. The
Supreme Court has not felt the need to grant any leaves to appeal in
GAAR cases since Copthorne.

IV. CONCLUSION
One of the most enduring debates in the legal literature is over the
role of the courts in interpreting legislation. The formalists distinguish
between legal reasoning and normative or policy considerations; they
assume there is a sharp separation between making the law and applying
it; and they maintain that what the law says is entirely distinct from what
it ought to say. Pragmatists do not see these sharp distinctions.
In interpreting legislation they don’t think judges have the authority to
determine the law according to their own ideas regarding the best policy
outcome, but that they have the responsibility to achieve an outcome that
accords with common sense and the principles that underlie the
legislation being interpreted. In tax cases, the Supreme Court has
generally clung tenaciously to the formalistic plain-meaning approach to
statutory interpretation in spite of frequently suggesting the correct
approach is a “textual, contextual, and purposive” approach.139 Justice
Rothstein continued in this tradition. This is regrettable, in our view,
given that his crisply written, carefully crafted and tightly reasoned
judgments might have been able to persuade the Court that the gaps and
ambiguities in tax legislation should be resolved by the courts in a way
that completes the work of Parliament, increases the fairness of tax law
and its moral acceptability, and generally improves the quality of the law.
Despite our differences in general approach, however, a review of Justice
Rothstein’s contributions to tax law reveals him to have made a
considerable contribution. This is perhaps no more true than in his
judgments in the GAAR cases, which demonstrate he had a sure grasp of
the principles and policies that animate the Act. He has set the courts on
solid ground and leaves a significant legacy for the Supreme Court’s next
tax judge.
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